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MODEST PROPOSALS FOR A COMPLEX PROBLEM: PATENT
MISUSE AND INCREMENTAL CHANGES TO THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT AS SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS.
I. INTRODUCTION

As the country struggles with myriad economic problems, the
escalating cost of health care in the United States has attracted much
attention.! The high cost of brand-name medications is one issue in
the spotlight.2 In 2008, Americans spent $2,339 billion on health
care, accounting for 16.2% of the country's gross domestic product. 3
Of that, $234.1 billion was spent on prescription medications. 4 The
Kaiser Family Foundation reports that prescription drugs account for
approximately 10% of health care spending in the United States
annually. 5 Further, the Department of Health and Human Services
projects that prescription drug spending will increase from $234.1
billion in 2008 to $457.8 billion in 2019, almost doubling over the
II-year period. 6
The introduction of generic medications can reduce the cost of
medications to consumers.?
However, the entry of generic
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

See, e.g., Robert Pear, Economy Led Americans to Limit Use of Routine Health
Services, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,2010, at A14.
See, e.g., Editorial, The High Cost of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.coml2007111125/0pinionl25sunl.html ?pagewanted= aiL
eMS Office of the Actuary, Health Spending Climbs to 16.2% ofGDP, HEALTHCARE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 25, 20 I 0), http://healthcare-economist.coml2010/01l25/healthspending-climbs-to-16-2-of-gdp/; u.s. Total Real National Health Expenditures
Using Alternative Price Deflators: 1929 to 2019, AMERICAN, www.google.com
(search "Google" for "u.s. Total Real National Health Expenditures Using
Alternative Price Deflators: 1929 to 2019"; click on the link titled, "Table 1.1 The
American") (last visited May 30,2012).
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/uploadl3057-08.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, FDA, http://www.fda.gov
/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapprovedlapprovalappl
ications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/default.htm (last visited May 30,
2012) ("A generic drug product is one that is comparable to an innovator drug product
in dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality, performance
characteristicsand mtended use. ").
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medications to the market prior to the expiration of a brand-name
medication's patent is anything but simple, and the brand-name
manufacturer often files suit against the generic challenger for patent
infringement. 8
Due to these suits between brand-name drug manufacturers and
generic drug manufacturers, so-called "reverse payment settlements"
are on the rise. 9 The agreements earned their name because unlike a
typical settlement, the patent holder who brought the suit pays or
otherwise compensates the alleged infringer, the generic
manufacturer. \0 Some critics label these agreements as "pay to
delay" agreements because generic drug manufacturers often receive
substantial payments or other incentives in exchange for delaying or
not marketing the sale of their generic competitors. I I As a result, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of Justice, and
private parties, such as consumers, have challenged these agreements
as violations of antitrust law. 12 A split between the Sixth, Second,
Eleventh, and Federal circuits has emerged. 13 Congress has also
proposed solutions through legislation such as the Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act. 14
This comment considers fIrst the process by which generic
medications enter the market and the statutory incentives in place to
encourage generic manufacturers to enter the market prior to the
expiration of a brand-name medication's patent. 15 Second, different
approaches adopted by the courts and proposed by Congress with
respect to reverse payment settlements will be addressed. 16 Finally,
8.
9.

10.

II.

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

See infra Part II.
FTC, PAY FOR DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS,
AN FTC STAFF STUDY 1, 8 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/osI2010/01l
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (noting that manufacturers entered three such agreements
in 2005, fourteen in 2006, fourteen in 2007, sixteen in 2008, and nineteen in 2009).
10blove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,
205 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The
Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 335 (2000» ("Payments pursuant to the
settlement of a patent suit such as those required under the Settlement Agreement are
referred to as "reverse" payments because, by contrast, '[t]ypically, in patent
infringement cases the payment flows from the alleged infringer to the patent
holder. ''').
See, e.g., Editorial, Faint Progress on Drug Payoffs, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at
A24.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S.27, 112th Congo (2011); see infra Part
IV.e.
See infra Parts II-III.
See infra Part IV.
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alternative solutions will be addressed including whether an ample
solution to the perceived problem of reverse payment settlements
already exists under the doctrine 0 f patent misuse or if an incremental
change to the Hatch-Waxman Act, tweaking the incentives available
to the first generic manufacturer to enter the market, offers the best
solution. 17
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Hatch-Waxman Act

In response to escalating drug costs, Congress changed the way
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves new drugs for
marketing and sale in the United States in 1984 when it passed the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (HatchWaxman Act).18 The legislation sought to lower the average price
paid by consumers for prescription pharmaceuticals. 19 To achieve
this goal, the Act established an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA) to bring generic drugs to the market faster. 2o The Act also
included provisions to encourage generic manufacturers to challenge
the patents of brand-name pharmaceutical companies. 21

1.

Abbreviated New Drug Applications: Getting Generics to
Market Faster

Prior to the change in the law, manufacturers seeking to market a
generic version of an existing drug faced the same rigorous standards
as new drug applications (NDA).22 Today, a generic manufacturer of
a previously patented medication can circumvent many of the
restrictions on the original manufacturer. 23 Generic manufacturers

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

23.

See infra Part V.
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417,98 Stat. 1538 (codified as amended in scattered sections of21 & 35 U.S.c.).
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, n.2 (lith Cir. 2005). The legislation
also served a goal somewhat at odds with reducing consumer prices, "preserv[ing] the
technologies pioneered by the brand-name pharmaceutical companies" and continuing
to encourage research and development. See id.
Id.
See i1!fra Part II. A. 1-2.
See 21 U.S.c. § 355(a)-(b) (2006); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the HatchWaxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
187, 187 (1999); Fiona M. Scott Morton, Entry Decisions in the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry, 30 RANDJ. EeoN. 421,422 (1999).
21 U.S.c. § 355U) (2006).
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filing an ANDA avoid the lengthy and costly process of
independently demonstrating the safety and efficacy of their products
because they need only to "demonstrate the 'bioequivalence' [of the
generic medication] to an already-approved innovator drug.,,24
Generic manufacturers can also file an application for approval
through the FDA prior to the expiration of the brand-name patent. 25
Since 1984, the number of generic pharmaceuticals entering the
market has risen dramatically. 26 Prior to the enactment of the HatchWaxman Act, generic medications for top-selling drugs could take
more than three years to enter the market following the expiration of
the brand-name drug's patent. 27 Today, introduction of a generic
often occurs in less than three months after a brand-name drug's
patent expires. 28
2.

Additional Incentives for Generics to Enter the Market Sooner

Streamlining the application process for generic manufacturers is
only one mechanism built into the Hatch-Waxman Act to bring less
expensive generic medications to consumers faster. The HatchWaxman Act also contains a provision that encourages generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers to challenge the validity of the patents
of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers prior to their
expiration. 29

24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.

CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at xii (1998),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/phann.pdf. "Bioequivalence
means that the active ingredient is absorbed at the same rate and to the same extent for
the generic drug as for the innovator drug." Id.
21 U.S.c. § 355(j); see also infra Part HA2.
CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 27.
Since the [Hatch-Waxman Act] became law in 1984, the market
share of generic drugs has indeed been rising steadily-although
not all of that increase stems from the act. For drugs that come III
easily countable units. such as tablets and capsules, the share of
generic units sold more than doubled between 1984 and 1996from 18.6 percent of all drug units sold to 42.6 percent.
Id. A greater desire by consumers to purchase generic medications as well as changes
to state laws making it easier for phannacists to prescribe generic substitutes are two
other sources for the change. Id. at xiv.
Id. at ix.

Id.
Op-Ed., The "Pay for Delay" Rap: The Drug Industry, the FTC and Overzealous
Antitrust, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, at A22.
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Paragraph IV certifications

During the application process, an ANDA filer must submit one of
four types of certifications.30
The most common of these
certifications are so-called "Paragraph III" and "Paragraph IV"
certifications. In a Paragraph III certification, the ANDA applicant
indicates that the FDA should certify its application upon the
expiration of the brand-name pharmaceutical's patent. 3l By filing a
so-called "Paragraph IV certification," the applicant certifies that the
relevant patent(s) on the brand-name drug are either "invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for
which the application is submitted. ,,)2
Once the FDA receives an ANDA filing, it has 180 days to accept
it. 33 After the FDA accepts an application containing a Paragraph IV
certification, the ANDA filer has twenty days to notify the brandname patent holder of its application. 34 Specifically, the ANDA
applicant must inform the brand:name patent holder of the reasons
the applicant believes the patent is either not infringed or is invalid. 35
The patent owner then has forty-five days to respond. 36 If the patent
owner sues for infringement within this period, the FDA institutes an
automatic thirty-month stay on the generic manufacturer's ANDA
approval. 3? This stay remains effective until the end of thirty months

30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

21 U.S.c. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
[A] certification, in the opinion oqhe applicant and to the best of
his knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the listed
drug referred to in clause (i) or which claims a use for such listed
drug for which the applicant is seeking approval under this
subsection and for which information is required to be filed under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section(n that such patent information has not been filed,
(In that such patent has expired,
(lIn of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(N) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted.
Jd.
Jd. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IIn.
Jd. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(N).
Jd. § 355(j)(5)(A).
21 U.S.C.A. § 355(b)(3)(B)(i) (2010).
21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2006).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Id.
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or until a court decision is reached regarding the infringement suit,
whichever is earlier. 38

b.

l80-day exclusivity period granted to first ANDAfiler

The fIrst ANDA fIler to make a Paragraph IV certifIcation and
gain FDA approval is rewarded with a I80-day market exclusivity
during which no subsequent ANDA fIlers can commence marketing
of their own generic version ofthe drug. 39 As discussed in Part IV.A,
when this exclusivity period commences depends on the
circumstances. 40 As a result of this exclusivity period, more generic
fIlers are seeking to enter the market sooner and Paragraph IV fIlings
have substantially increased. 41
III. RISE OF "REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT"
AGREEMENTS
The lure of a I80-day exclusivity period to generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers as well as the high stakes at play for brand-name
manufacturers facing Paragraph IV challenges has had a signifIcant
impact on the way such suits are litigated and settled. 42 As a result,
reverse payment settlement agreements between brand-name and
These
generic medication manufacturers are on the rise. 43
38.

39.
40.
41.

42.

43.

Jd. Notably, launching a generic pharmaceutical at the end of the thirty-month stay
but before a court decision regarding the Paragraph N certification is not without
risks. Generic companies whose products are found to infringe after such a launch
may be liable for treble damages. RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., PHARMACEUTICALS:
ANALYZING
LITIGATION
SUCCESS
RATES
3-4
(2010),
available
at
http://amlawdaily.typepad. com/pharmareport. pdf.
21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
See infra Part N.A.
RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., supra note 38, at 3 (indicating the following trend for
first-to-file lawsuits since 2003: thirteen (2003), fifteen (2004), twenty-four (2005),
twenty-seven (2006), forty-three (2007), fifty-one (2008), and sixty-five (2009».
Loss or expiration of patent protection ofa brand-name pharmaceutical has significant
implications for its manufacturer. For example, Pfizer's anticipated yearly revenue
loss due to the expiration of its Lipitor patent was $10 billion. Duff Wilson, Drug
Firms Face Billions in Losses in '11 as Patents End, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2011, at
AI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/business/07drug.html?page
wanted=2&sq=Drug Firms Face Billions in Losses in 'II as Patents
End&st=cse&scp=1. When its patent for Claritin expired in 2003, Schering Plough
saw its stocks' value drop 20% while annual sales for the drug plummeted from $2
billion in 2002 to less than $200 million in the first half of 2003. Amy Tsao,
Schering-Plough: Drugmaker, Heal Thyself, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June II, 2003,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/contentijun2003/tc20030611_0956_tc055.
htm.
FTC, supra note 9, at 1.
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agreements earned their name because they travel in the opposite
direction of a typical settlement-the patent holder who brought the
suit originally makes a settlement payment to the alleged infringer,
the generic manufacturer. 44
Reverse payment settlements take a variety of forms. They can
vary from a cash payment from the brand-name to the generic
manufacturer to an agreement by the generic manufacturer to stay out
of the market for a set period of time (''with or without royalty
payments to the brand-name manufacturer,,).45 Agreements can also
include provisions for "ancillary business transactions such as crosslicensing or supply agreements" or provide that the brand-name
manufacturer will not market or license an authorized generic for a
set time after the generic manufacturer launches its product. 46 It is
not uncommon for agreements to include a combination of these
provisions. 47

A.

Impact of Reverse Payment Settlements on Consumers

The introduction of generic versions of brand-name medications
has the potential to significantly lower the cost of pharmaceuticals to
consumers over time. As such, reverse payment settlements are
criticized in part due to their potential to slow consumers' access to
generic medications and keep medication prices higher for longer. 48
In 2008, on average, brand-name prescription medications cost four
times more than generic medications ($137.90 compared to $35.22).49
In that same year, generic medications accounted for 22% of the total
drug sales in the United States and 72% of the total prescriptions
dispensed. 50
While the exact impact of the introduction of generic
pharmaceuticals on consumer prices is subject to some debate,51 it is
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.

51.

See supra note 10.
Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag & Laura Tyson, An Economic Assessment of Patent
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 374 (2010).
Id. An authorized generic is a drug that has been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration as a brand-name medication, which the brand-name manufacturer
decides to market simultaneously with the brand-name version of its medication, but
under different trade dress and at a generic price. FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN
INTERIM REpORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.fic.gov/os/2009/061P062105
authorizedgenericsreport.pdf.
See infra Part N.B.
Faint Progress on Drug Payoffs, supra note II.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 4, at 3.
Id. at 4.
See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at 29.
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clear that increased competition reduces prices. 52 Studies by the FDA
indicate the fIrst generic competitor typically enters the marketplace
at a price point only slightly lower than its brand-name counterpart,
resulting in only small savings to a consumer. 53 However, the
entrance of a second generic manufacturer to the market can decrease
the cost of a generic version of a medication to half that of its brandname counterpart. 54 Further, the entry of a signifIcant number of
generic manufacturers into the marketplace can result in a price point
for the generic medications at a rate 20% or lower than the cost of the
brand-name drug. 55
A Congressional Budget OffIce (CBO) report suggests a slightly
different impact on prices as the result of the introduction of generic
pharmaceuticals than the FDA's estimates. 56 The CBO report
indicates that the fITst generic competitor to enter the market typically
enters at a price point 25% lower than the brand-name
pharmaceutical. 57 The introduction of additional generic medications
can lower the market price by as much as 60% of the brand-name
price. 58
The FTC estimates that reverse payment settlements cost
American consumers anywhere between $0.6 billion and $7.5 billion
each year, or $3.5 billion each year on average. 59 As such, the FTC
asserts that banning these agreements outright has the potential to
save consumers $35 billion over the course of a decade. 60

52.

53.
54.

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM iMPACT,
at ii-iii, 63, 118 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011108/2011generic
drugreport.pdf; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, available at
http://www. fda. govlAboutFD NCentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobaccol
CDERlucm129385.htm.
Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.; see also CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at xiii ("[W]hen one to 10 firms
are manufacturing and distributing generic forms of a particular drug, the generic
retail price of that drug averages about 60 percent of the brand-name price. When
more than 10 manufacturers have entered the market, the average generic prescription
price falls to less than half of the brand-name price. ").
Paradoxically, the Congressional Budget Office study also suggested that brand-name
pharmaceutical prices actually increase after the introduction of a generic competitor.
Id. at 29. One study found a one percent increase in the brand-name price as a result
of each new generic competitor that entered the marketplace. Id.
CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 24, at xlli.
Id.
Id.
FTC, supra note 9, at 8, 10.
Id. (calculating the ten-year average on the basis of the $3.5 billion per year average).
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l80-day Exclusivity Period and Its Impact on Reverse Payment
Settlements

Eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period is a significant
incentive to generic manufacturers to be the fIrst ANDA filer since
they are guaranteed a window of time where they are competing only
with the brand-name manufacturer. 61 Further, even if the fIrst ANDA
filer enters the market at a price point as much as 25% below the
brand-name price, it still enjoys a greater profit margin than
subsequent generic manufacturers who might drive generic prices
down to less than 50% of the market price of the brand-name drug. 62
The exclusivity period also bestows upon the fIrst ANDA filer a
unique bargaining power, which fuels the reverse payment settlement
system. 63 In some situations, a generic manufacturer has strong
incentives to settle an infringement suit rather than proceed to trial.
For example, the potential profits the generic manufacturer stands to
gain on entry into the market may be outweighed by the potential loss
in profits faced by the brand-name manufacturer when it must
compete with a generic medication. 64 The uncertainties of the
litigation process can also influence generic and brand-name
manufacturers, with the generic manufacturer settling to avoid the
"risk of losing the case and being unable to market during the life of
the patent" and the brand-name settling in order to avoid the risk of
"losing the case and revenues from the patent exclusivity altogether"
if the court fmds its patent invalid. 65

61.
62.

63.

64.

65.

See supra Part II.A.2.b.
See CONGo BUDGET OFFICE. supra note 24, at xiii; see also text accompanying notes
57-58.
Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REv. 57,90,91 n.201, 92-93 (2010).
Id. at 93.
[If] the ANDA filer has a ten percent chance of victory at trial, the
generic stands to earn $10 million if it wins and enters the market,
and the patent holder stands to lose $200 million if it loses its
monopoly. The ANDA filer's expected value is $1 million ($10
million multiplied by a ten percent chance of victory). The patent
holder's expected loss is $20 million ($200 million multiplied by a
ten percent chance of loss at trial). These different expected
values establish a bargaining range of $1 million to $20 million.
Id. at 94.
Gerard Sobel, Consideration of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases Challenging HatchWaxman Act Settlements, 20 FED. OR. 8J. 47, 52 (2010).
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Importantly, due to more recent changes in the law, the fIrst
ANDA fIler retains its 180-day exclusivity period despite entering a
settlement. 66 As a result, some agreements offer a compromise
between the two extremes, with a fIrst ANDA fIler agreeing to delay
marketing of its generic for a specifIed period, but still being able to
commence sales prior to the expiration of the brand-name drug's
Given these considerations, both the brand-name
patent. 67
manufacturer and the fIrst ANDA fIler stand to benefIt greatly in
some circumstances by settling their lawsuit and preventing or
delaying the generic medication's entry into the market.
IV. APPROACHES TO THE REVERSE PAYMENT PROBLEM
Although no such agreements were entered into in 2004, a recent
study indicates that reverse payment settlements have been rising
steadily over the last few years. 68 The increased prevalence of these
agreements has led to myriad proposed solutions with some courts
and critics considering them to be illegal restraints of trade that
should be subject to antitrust law. 69
A.

An Early Effort: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003

The
Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement,
and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) , represents one attempt to deal
with the continued rise of prescription drug prices and the advent of
reverse payment settlements following the implementation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 70 The MMA effectively changed the playing
fIeld by altering the events that trigger an ANDA fIler's 180-day
exclusivity period and implementing six provisions whereby the fIrst
ANDA fIler forfeits the exclusivity period.
Prior to MMA, the earlier of one of two events could trigger the
180-day exclusivity period: (l) a fmal court decision holding the
brand-name patent invalid, unenforceable, or uninfringed, or (2) the
commencement of commercial sales by the fIrst ANDA applicant. 71
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See infra Part IVA
See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
FTC, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that manufacturers entered three such agreements in
2005, fourteen in 2006, fourteen in 2007, sixteen in 2008, and nineteen in 2009).
See infra Part IV.B.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.c.).
La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD
Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 901 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003)).
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As a result, if a brand-name and generic manufacturer entered a
reverse payment settlement, subsequent ANDA filers were
effectively blocked from entering the market until the expiration of
the brand-name patent because the ftrst ANDA filer's 180-day
exclusivity period was never triggered. 72 Under the MMA, the 180day exclusivity period can now be triggered only by the
commencement of commercial sales by the first ANDA filer. 73
Additionally, the 180-day exclusivity period is limited in that it does
not extend beyond the life of the patent of the innovator drug. 74
The MMA also added six provisions whereby the first ANDA filer
would forfeit its 180-day exclusivity period. 75 If all ftrst ANDA filers
forfeit their 180-day exclusivity, subsequent ANDA applicants are
ineligible for the 180-day exclusivity period, but can still attempt to
enter the market prior to the expiration of the brand-name patent. 76
First, forfeiture can result from the withdrawal of the ANDA
filer's application77 or second, by amendment of the Paragraph IV
certiftcation after filing. 78 Third, failure of the ANDA filer to obtain
approval of its application from the FDA within thirty months of
filing also triggers forfeiture of the exclusivity period. 79 Fourth, the
expiration of the relevant innovator patents can trigger forfeiture of
the exclusivity period. 80 Fifth, if the ftrst ANDA filer enters an

72.
73.
74.

75.

76.

77.
7S.
79.
SO.

21 U.S.c. § 355G)(5)(B)(iv) (2000) (amended 2003).
21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2006).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II). Following the expiration of the innovator patent, the
ANDA filer's Paragraph IV certification is reclassified under Paragraph II, which
certifies that the brand-name patent has expired. See id. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii)(II), (IV).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(I)-(VI). Use of these forfeiture provisions is relatively rare. See
Kurt R Karst, Taking Stock of FDA's lBO-Day Exclusivity Forfeiture Decisions-A
Forfeiture Scorecard, FDA L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2010, 3:46 PM),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fdaJaw_blog_hyman-IJhelps/2010/01/taking-stock-ofIS0day-exclusivity-forfeiture-a-forfeiture-scorecard-.html. Between their enactment
in 2003 and 2009, only thirteen ANDA applicants forfeited their exclusivity period
with the majority (ten) losing the marketing right due to failure to obtain tentative
approval within a thirty-month period. Id.
21 U.S.c. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii). The "term 'first applicant' means an applicant that ...
submits a substantially complete application" according to the requirements of the
statute. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(II)(bb). Theoretically, more than one generic
manufacturer can qualify as a first filer, and, thus, two or more companies could share
the ISO-day exclusivity period in cases where more than one "substantially complete"
ANDA application is filed on the same day.
ld. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(II).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(III).
!d. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI).
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agreement with another applicant, the marketing exclusivity period is
forfeited. 81
Finally, the most problematic of the six provisions provides that
the fIrst ANDA fIler can forfeit exclusivity by failing to market the
product. 82 This forfeiture event is contingent upon the occurrence of
two triggering events. 83 SpecifIcally, the statute defmes a failure to
market a drug as the later of one of two dates. 84 First, under
21 USC 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa) ("(aa)"), the earlier of either 75 days
after the approval of the fIrst ANDA fIler's application or 30 months
after the date of submission of the fIrst ANDA fIler's application. 85
Second, under 21 USC 35 5(j)(5)(D)( i) (I) (bb) ("(bb)"), 75 days after
one of the following: (1) a fmal court decision ("other than on
petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari") that all of the
brand-name patents challenged by the fIrst ANDA fIler's Paragraph
IV certifIcation are invalid or not infringed; (2) a settlement in an
infringement action in which the court enters a fInal judgment that
includes a judicial fmding that the brand-name patents challenged by
the fIrst ANDA fIler's Paragraph IV certifIcation are invalid or not
infringed; or (3) the brand-name manufacturer withdraws the patents
subject to the challenge of the fIrst ANDA filer's Paragraph IV
certifIcation. 86 However, these provisions still do not obviate the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

86.

Id.
Id. § 355G)(5)(D)(i)(I).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 355G)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa).
The first applicant fails to market the drug by the later of(aa) the earlier of the date that is(AA) 75 days after the date on which the approval of the
application of the first applicant is made effective under
subparagraph (B)(iii); or
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission of the application
of the first applicant; ....
Id.
Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb).
[W]ith respect to the first applicant or any other applicant (which
other applicant has received tentative approval), the date that is 75
days after the date as of which, as to each of the patents with
respect to which the first applicant submitted and lawfully
maintained a certification qualifying the first applicant for the
180-day exclusivity period under subparagraph (B)(iv), at least 1
of the following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action brought against that applicant
with respect to the patent or in a declaratory judgment action
brought by that applicant with respect to the patent, a court enters
a final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the
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need for a fmal court decision regarding the validity of the brandname manufacturer's patent to trigger the forfeiture of the I80-day
exclusivity period because both an (aa) and a (bb) event must occur
in order for the forfeiture provision to kick in. 87
Given these six provisions, while there are now more ways that
the I80-day exclusivity period can be triggered or forfeited, reverse
payment settlements can still limit or bar the ability of subsequent
ANDA filers to enter the market prior to the expiration of the brandname patent. Further, absent the incentive of the exclusivity period,
some generic manufacturers may be reticent to seek to enter the
market ahead of the brand-name patent's expiration given the
potential to be sued by the brand-name manufacturer for
infringement. 88
B.

Reaction of the Courts: Reverse Payment Settlements and
Antitrust Law

The courts have differed when addressing the question of whether
reverse payment settlements violate the antitrust provisions of the
Sherman Act. Specifically, the Sherman Act prohibits "[ e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.,,89
"[M]onopoliz[ation], or attempt[s] to monopolize, or combin[ations]
or conspir[acies] ... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States" are also forbidden. 90 In order to establish
an antitrust cause of action, a plaintiff must prove (1) injury in fact;

Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken
that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment
action described in sub item (AA), a court signs a settlement order
or consent decree that enters a final judgment that includes a
finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed.
(CC) The patent information submitted under subsection (b) or
(c) of this section is withdrawn by the holder of the application
approved under subsection (b) of this section.

87.

88.
89.
90.

Id.
See Teva North America, FDA Decision Letter: ANDA 77-165: Granisetron
Hydrochloride Injection, ImglmL, Docket No. 2007N-0389 (Jan. 17,2008), available
at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/docketsIDOCKETS/07n0389/07n-0389-1etOO03.pdf
(finding that in absence of both an (aa) and (bb) date, the exclusivity period is not
forfeited).
See supra Part II.A2.a.
15 U.S.c. § I (2006).
Id. § 2.
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(2) proximate cause; and (3) antitrust injury-(a) the type of injury
intended to be prevented by antitrust law and (b) an injury that "flows
from that which makes the defendant's actions unlawful.,,91
Cases involving reverse payment settlements have created a split
between the circuits. The Sixth Circuit has held them to be unlawful
per se.92 The Second Circuit and Federal Circuit have both found that
reverse payment settlements are presumptively legal and within the
The
scope of the brand-name manufacturer's patent rights. 93
Eleventh Circuit applied a three-p-"'ong analysis accounting for "(1)
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting
anticompetitive effects. ,,94 Thus far the Supreme Court has denied
certiorari on cases dealing with reverse payment settlements. 95
1.

Sixth Circuit Holds Reverse Payment Settlements Per Se Illegal

In In re Cardizem, a group of consumers of the heart medication
diltiazem hydrochloride filed suit against the drug's brand-name
manufacturer, Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (HMR), and a generic
manufacturer, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Andrx) of a less
The plaintiffs alleged that the drug
expensive version. 96
manufacturers violated the Sherman Act and state antitrust laws by
entering into a settlement whereby Andrx agreed to refrain from
marketing its generic version of the medication, even after FDA
approval of its ANDA, in exchange for quarterly payments of $10
million. 97
The Sixth Circuit considered the use of the rule of reason, but
ultimately adopted the rule that pay for delay agreements are
unlawful per se and found the agreement constituted a classic case of
91.
92.
93.

94.

95.
96.
97.

See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477,488-89 (1977).
See, e.g., La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 900, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 104-D7
(2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606, 1606 (2011); Ark. Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciproflaxin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544
F.3d 1323, 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2008); loblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,212-13 (2d Cir. 2006).
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1Ith Cir. 2005) (citing Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11 th Cir. 2003)); see
also Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d 1294.
See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund, 604 F .3d at 104-07, cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. at 1606.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 899-902. The drug sold under the
brand-name Cardizem CD. Jd
Id. at 899-900.
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horizontal restraint of trade in vio lation of the Sherman Act. 98 Some
types of restraints, the court reasoned, are unlawful per se when "they
'have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and
such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit. ,,,99 Under this
approach, the parties' intent, the potential for a pro-competitive
effect, or the lack of any actual impact on competition are
irrelevant. 100
2.

The Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits Allow Reverse
Payment Settlements

In cases involving reverse payment settlements, the Second,
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have all rejected the reasoning applied
by the Sixth Circuit and held that reverse payment settlements are not
presumptively unlawful under a variety of different approaches.
a.

Second Circuit case law favors settlements

In In re Tamoxifen, a group of consumers, medical benefits
providers, and consumer advocacy groups filed suit against the
brand-name patent holder and the fITst ANDA filer for a cancer drug,
tamoxifen, alleging that the reverse payment settlement between the
two pharmaceutical companies created a monopoly in violation of the
Sherman Act. !Ol Under the terms ofthe settlement agreement, which
included a $21 million do lIar payment to the generic manufacturer to
not sell its generic version of tamoxifen, subsequent ANDA filers
were prevented from obtaining approval to sell their generic versions
of the drug because the generic manufacturer's l80-day exclusivity
period was never triggered. 102
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that reverse
payment settlements are presumptively legal.!03 The court reasoned
that reverse payment settlements fall within the scope of a brandId. at 906-08. To apply a rule of reason analysis, the "finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition,
taking into account a variety of factors, including specific infonnation about the
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
restraint's history, nature, and effect." Id. at 906 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3,10 (1997)).
99.
Id.
100. Id. at 906-907 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)).
101. Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,
190 (2d Cir. 2006).
102. Id. at 193-94.
103. Id. at 206.
98.
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name manufacturer's patent even if they limit competition because
"the patent holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to
protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly
over the manufacture and distribution of the patented prodUCt."I04
Further, such settlements make sense due to the high degree of risk
borne by the brand-name manufacturer in the litigation compared to
the relatively low risk faced by the ANDA filer. 105 Finally, even if a
brand-name manufacturer's patent is weak and a reverse payment
settlement helps extend it artificially, "[i]t is unlikely that the holder
of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers with
exclusion payments because the economics simply would not justify
it. ,,106
The court also questioned whether the plaintiffs suffered an injury
sufficient to support an antitrust claim, noting that "[t]he injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of
anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.,,107 Additionally,
the court stated that even if the plaintiffs were assumed to have stated
an antitrust violation and alleged a sufficient injury:
any injury that the plaintiffs suffered ... resulted from [the
brand-name manufacturer's] valid patent and from the
inability of other generic manufacturers to establish that the
patent was either invalid or not infringed-and not from any
agreement between [the generic manufacturer and the
brand-name manufacturer that the former] should employ its
exclusivity powers to exclude competition. 108

b.

Federal Circuit/avors presumptive legality o/reverse payment
settlements

In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals considered a settlement between the
brand-name patent holder, Bayer, and generic manufacturer, Barr,
which had been challenged on antitrust grounds by a group of

104. Jd. at 208-09.
105. Jd. at 207.
106. Jd. at 212 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d
514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), afJ'd in part, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), afJ'd, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010».
107. Job/ave, 466 F.3d at 219 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 489 (1977».
108. Id.
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consumers and advocacy groups. 109 Bayer agreed to pay Barr $49.1
million to delay marketing its generic version of Cipro until six
months before Bayer's brand-name patent expired.lJO The settlement
also required Bayer to make quarterly payments to Barr for a sevenyear period totaling $349 million or to supply Barr with Cipro for
resale. III
Similar to the reasoning of the Second Circuit, the court
determined that "the essence of the Agreements was to exclude the
defendants from profiting from the patented invention," which was
"well within Bayer's rights as the patentee.,,1l2 The court also
emphasized the long-standing public policy in favor of settlement
agreements in infringement litigation, particularly in Hatch-Waxman
litigation where the relative risks for the brand-name manufacturer
are high. 113

c.

Eleventh Circuit develops a three-part analysis to determine the
legality of reverse payment settlements

In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission,
pharmaceutical companies Schering-Plough, the brand-name patent
holder, and Upsher-Smith Laboratories, the first ANDA filer,
petitioned for a review of the FTC's determination that their patent
infringement settlement agreement constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 1l4 As part of a June
1997 settlement agreement in its suit against Upsher for patent
infringement, Schering agreed to license the rights to several drugs
owned by Upsher in exchange for the latter's agreement to delay
marketing its generic version of Schering's drug, K-Dur 20 until at
least September 2001.115 In 1998, Schering entered into settlement
with another generic manufacturer, ESI, whereby ESI agreed to
license two drugs to Schering and postpone marketing its version of
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1328-30.
Id. at 1328-29.
Id. at 1329 & n.5.
Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1333 & n.11 (citing Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2001)); see also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (lIth Cir.
2005); Foster v. Hal1co Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469,477 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
114. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058. The Eleventh Circuit also addressed the
question of reverse payment settlements in an earlier case, Valley Drug Co. v Geneva
Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,1296 (lIth Cir. 2003).
115. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1058-59. The final terms of the licensing deal
"called for Schering to pay (l) $60 million in initial royalty fees; (2) $10 million in
milestone royalty payments; and (3) 10% or 15% royalties on sales." Id. at 1060.
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K-Dur 20 until January 2004 in exchange for $5 million to cover
legal fees and $15 million apiece for the two drug licenses. 116
In 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint against
Schering, Upsher, and ESI alleging that the settlement agreements
violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §
45 and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1.117 Specifically,
the FTC had determined that the multimillion-dollar payments to
Upsher and ESI did not represent "legitimate consideration" for the
The FTC also claimed that "Schering
two agreements. 118
monopolized and conspired to monopolize the potassium supplement
market."119 In reaching its decision, the FTC "prohibited settlements
under which the generic receives anything of value and agrees to
defer its own research, development, production or sales
activities. ,,120
The court determined neither a per se or rule of reason approach
was appropriate to analyze the settlements at issue. 121 The court
recognized that Schering, by obtaining its initial patent for K-Dur 20,
"obtained the legal right to exclude Upsher and ESI from the market
until they proved either that [Schering's patent] was invalid or that
their [generic] products ... did not infringe Schering's patent. ,,122 As
such, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement, after which the
defendant must prove its pro-competitive objectives. Specifically,
the Court stated that "the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires
an examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and
(3) the resulting anticompetitive effects."123

116. Id. at 1060-61 n.8. Specifically, the agreement included "$5 million noncontingent
payment, representing legal fees, and an additional $10 million contingent on ESI's
FDA approval. Schering and ESI also entered into a contemporaneous license
agreement whereby ESI granted Schering the licenses to enalpril and buspirone in
exchange for $15 million." Id
117. Id at 1061. While the legality of ESI's agreement with Schering remained an issue at
the trial, the complaint against it was withdrawn before the trial so it was not a party
to any of the proceedings. Id. at 1061 n.9.
118. Id. at 1062.
119. Id at 1061.
120. Id at 1062. The only exception under the FTC's standard was for payments to a
generic manufacturer for up to $2 million in litigation fees so long as the Commission
was notified ofthe settlement.
121. !d. at 1065.
122. Id at 1066-67.
123. Id. at 1066 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, l312 (lIth
Cir. 2003)).
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One Congressional Solution: The Preserving Access to
Affordable Generics Act

The split between the federal circuit courts has led congressional
members to propose resolutions of the conflict through the
introduction of legislation, such as the "Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act" (S. 27).124 First introduced during the
109th Congress in 2006 as S. 3582, this legislation has lead to
significant debate amongst congressional members. 125 During the
111 th Congress, the bill's potential to pass in both chambers of
Congress looked promising. 126 The House passed a companion
version of the bill (H.R. 1706) as part of a supplemental
appropriations bill; however, efforts to pass the bill in the Senate
ultimately failed. 127

124. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S.27, 112th Congo (20Il). Introduced
by Sen. Herb Kohl (D-WI) with original co-sponsors Sens. Sherrod Brown (D-OH),
Susan Collins (R-ME), Richard Durbin (D-IL), AI Franken (D-MN), Sen. Chuck
Grassley (R-IA), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), and Bernard Sanders (D-VT). In addition
to costing consumers a significant amount of money, the federal government also
carries a substantial portion ofthe cost of prescription drugs. Jd at § 2(a)(5) ("Federal
dollars currently account for an estimated 30 percent of the $235,000,000,000 spent
on prescription drugs in 200S, and this share is expected to rise to 40 percent by
201S.").
125. See. e.g., Preserve Access to Mfordable Generics Act, S.35S2, 109th Congo (2006);
Donald Zuhn, Pay-For-Delay Provision Added to Senate Appropriations Bill, PATENT
Docs BLOG (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/0S/payfordelayprovision-back-in-appropriations-bill.html.
126. See S. 369: Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-369 (last visited May 30,2012). During the
111 th Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary filed a written report (Report No.
111-123) on S. 369 and minority views were filed; however, the proposed bill did not
proceed to a Senate and House vote. Id.
127. See Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 1IIth
Congo (2009). During the I1lth Congress, the Senate version of the bill, Preserve
Access to Mfordable Generics Act, S.369, 11lth Congo (2009), was attached to the
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2011, S. 3677, 111 th
Congo (2010) (enacted), in a hotly debated vote that came down largely along party
lines. GPhA Comments on 15-15 Senate Appropriations Committee Vote on Patent
Settlements, GENERIC PHARM. ASS'N (July 30, 2010), http://www.gphaonline.org/
medialpress-releases/20 IO/gpha-comments-I5-15-senate-appropriations-committeevote-patent-settlement. However, the addition was ultimately removed before the Act
passed. Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2011, S.
3677, 11lth Congo (2010) (enacted).
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Provisions of the Preserving Access to Affordable Generics Act

Contrary to the holdings of the Second, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits, under the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act and
more in line with the approach favored by the FTC, nearly all
agreements would be considered per se unlawful subject to a
rebuttable presumption. 128 The proposed law permits the FTC to
"initiate a proceeding to enforce the provisions of this section against
the parties to any agreement resolving or settling, on a fmal or
interim basis, a patent infringement claim in connection with the sale
of a drug product.,,129 Specifically, any agreement where "an ANDA
filer receives anything of value, and the ANDA filer agrees to limit or
forego research, development, manufacturing, or sales of the ANDA
product for any period of time" is presumptively anti-competitive and
unlawful. 130 This provision essentially removes all of the burden of
proof from the FTC and makes reverse payment agreements per se
illegal, with few exceptions. 131
To defeat the presumption of unlawfulness, the parties to an
agreement must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the pro-competitive benefits of the agreement outweigh [its] anticompetitive effects."l32 To determine whether an agreement is not
anti-competitive, the court would need to account for the following
factors:
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of
the relevant patent, compared with the agreed upon entry
date for the ANDA product;

(2) the value to consumers of the competition from the
ANDA product allowed under the agreement;
(3) the form and amount of consideration received by the
ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling the patent
infringement claim;
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by
winning the patent litigation;
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost
the patent litigation;

128. See supra Part IV.B.2.
129. s. 27, § 28(a)(1).
130. Id. § 28(a)(2).
131. See id.
132. Id. § 28(a)(2)(8).
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6) the time period between the date of the agreement
conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of the
settlement of the patent infringement claim; and
(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion,
deems relevant to its determination of competitive effects
under this subsection. 133
2.

Concerns with the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act

If passed, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act has the
potential to weed out some problematic reverse payment settlements;
however, it also has the potential to interfere with agreements that
can benefit consumers. Based on the information available, it is
anything but clear as to whether every reverse payment settlement is
anti-competitive by nature. 134
Critics of an outright ban posit that it would "reduce the incentive
to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options
should he be sued for infringement, and so might well be thought
anti-competitive.,,135 Further, other opponents suggest that some
reverse settlements can actually be positive and result in generic
drugs entering the market faster than they would have had litigation
been pursued and before the expiration of the patent in question. 136
An independent 2010 report from RBC Capital Markets concluded
that of the thirty-seven new generic drug launches expected in 2010
and 2011, twenty-four of them would launch prior to patent
expiration because of settlements. 137
Implementing a per se presumption against all agreements where
the ANDA filer receives "anything of value" overcompensates for the
problem posed by reverse payment settlements. Not all such
agreements have an anticompetitive effect. Requiring the parties to
prove the pro-competitive nature of their agreement has the potential
to discourage valid settlements. 138 The additional costs and time
133. Id. § 28(b).
134. See id. § 28(a)(2).
135.

Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989 (N.D. lll.

2003), dismissed, 104 F. App'x. 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
136. The "Pay for Delay" Rap, supra note 29.
137. RBC CAPITAL MKTS. CORP., supra note 38, at app. A.
138. Yuki Onoe, "Pay-for-Delay" Settlements in Pharmaceutical Litigation: Drawing a
Fine Line Between Patent Zone and Antitrust Zone, 9 J. MARSHALL REv. INTELL.
PROP. L. 527,545-46 (2009); see also The "Pay for Delay'· Rap, supra note 29. "If
the only choice is an expensive litigation death match that lasts for years, fewer
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involved in litigating the various stipulations of the bill also has the
potential to defeat the benefits of settling and to further hamper the
efficiency of the legal system. 139
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS: PATENT MISUSE AND
INCREMENTAL CHANGES TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT
A significant problem with reverse payment settlements is their
impact on both the ability and interest of subsequent ANDA filers to
enter the market prior to the expiration of a brand-name
manufacturer's patent. 140
A.

Patent Misuse: A Potential Solution to the Problem of Reverse
Payment Settlements Without the Needfor Legislative Action by
Congress

An alternative means of triggering the forfeiture of the first
AND A filer's I80-day exclusivity period would be for subsequent
ANDA filers to invoke the defense of patent misuse in response to
infringement charges by the brand-name manufacturer. With a lower
threshold of proof than that required for a successful antitrust inquiry,
a successful patent misuse defense to an infringement suit would
result in the invalidation of the brand-name manufacturer's patent,
thus opening the door to increased competition by other generic
manufacturers and lower prices for consumers. 141
1.

The Advantages of Patent Misuse as a Solution

Patent misuse has its origins in the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands, "whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to
enforcement of a patent that has been misused." 142 It is an affirmative

139.

140.

141.

142.

generic companies will sue under the probability that they will themselves face patent
infringement suits." Id
See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 63, at 109-10 (discussing Prof. Daniel Crane's
proposition that requiring non-trial determinations as to the potential validity of an
infringement suit as being akin to a "mini-trial" that would "swallow the benefits of
settlement that parties seek").
See supra Part III.
Marshall Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 101. HIGH TECH L. 142, 147 (2010)
(citing Eugene R. Quinn, Jr., Abusing Intellectual Property Rights in Cyberspace:
Patent Misuse Revisited, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 955, 988-89 (2002)).
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Patent
misuse originated as a court-made remedy rather than a legislative one. The Supreme
Court first applied the doctrine in 1917 in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Section 271(d) of Title 35 of the U.S. Code
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defense that can be invoked by a party charged with patent
infringement or breach of a license agreement. 143 The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated, "[t]he key inquiry under
this fact-intensive doctrine is whether, by imposing the condition, the
patentee has 'impermissibly broadened the "physical or temporal
scope" of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect. ",144 The
doctrine of misuse is meant "to restrain practices that [do] not in
themselves violate any law, but that [draw] anticompetitive strength
from the patent right, and thus [are] deemed to be contrary to public
policy.,,145 When a court fmds a party guilty of patent misuse, the
judgment renders the patent in question unenforceable. 146
Although some critics argue that the importance of patent misuse
has waned thanks to the continued development of antitrust law,
others argue that due to the fundamental differences between the two,
patent misuse retains its validity in the modem age. 147 Most
critically, a patent owner's conduct need not rise to the level of an

addresses patent misuse briefly in the negative by defining some of the actions by a
patent holder that do not constitute misuse, although the provision is not exhaustive.
It states:
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement
or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1)
derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without
his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the
patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if
performed without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights
against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the
license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented
product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent
or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the
circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned.
35 U.S.c. § 271(d)(2006).
143. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 153.
144. B. Braun Med.. Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc.,
782 F.2d 995,1001--02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
145. Mallinkrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
146. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 147 (citing Quinn, Jr., supra note 141, at 988-89).
147. Jd. at 152-60.
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antitrust violation in order for the defense of patent misuse to be
raised by another party. 148
Because defendants claiming patent misuse need not demonstrate
that they have been harmed by the alleged misuse, the doctrine
presents a novel solution to the impact of reverse payment
settlements on subsequent ANDA filers.149 An affirmative defense,
patent misuse could be used by subsequent ANDA filers seeking to
challenge the I80-day exclusivity period of first ANDA filers. Under
this approach, a subsequent ANDA filer being sued by the innovator
patent owner for infringement can respond with the defense that the
brand-name manufacturer misused its patent. 150 If successful, the
innovator patent is invalidated, and the first ANDA filer would thus
effectively forfeit its I80-day exclusivity period. lSI
When faced with the possibility of having both the brand-name
patent and the generic patent declared invalid due to a reverse
payment agreement frustrating "the public good," both parties might
be less likely to enter such an agreement in the first place. Although
the subsequent ANDA filer would no longer have the incentive of the
I80-day exclusivity period, it would still stand to gain much more by
effectively opening up the marketplace to generic manufacturers.
Still, the lack of I80-day exclusivity might be enough to discourage
many takers from this option given the expense involved in pursuing
litigation and the uncertainty of the outcome. 152
2.

Potential Problems with the Patent Misuse Defense: Disclosure
of Settlement Agreements

Typically, when two parties settle, the settlement agreement is
done outside the court system entirely. If the two parties stipulate to
a judgment, it is considered more as a contract between the parties
148.

Id. at 153-54. In order to establish an antitrust cause of action, a plaintiff must prove
(1) injury in fact, (2) proximate cause, (3) antitrust injury-(a) the type of injury
intended to be prevented by antitrust law and (b) an injury that "flows from that which
makes defendant's acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977). "Patent misuse is viewed as a broader wrong than antitrust
violation because of the economic power that may be derived from the patentee's right
to exclude. Thus misuse may arise when the conditions of antitrust violation are not
met." 6 R CARL Moy, MoY's WALKER ON PATENTS § 18:1 n.l0 (4th ed. 2011)
(quoting C.R Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
149. Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1922, 1924
(1997); see also supra Part IV.B.2.a-b (discussing the Second Circuit and Federal
Circuit's approaches to reverse settlements).
150. See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419,1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
151. Leaffer, supra note 141, at 147.
152. See Sobel, supra note 65, at 51-52; supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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than as a final judgment by the court. However, under the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003
(MMA), certain types of settlement agreements between brand-name
manufacturers and generic manufacturers must be disclosed to the
FTC within ten days of their execution. 153 Interestingly, the
information disclosed to the FTC regarding the specifics of these
agreements is kept secret from disclosure "except as may be relevant
to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding." 154
The inability to obtain information regarding the agreements a
brand-name manufacturer has entered into with the first ANDA filer
and other subsequent ANDA filers can pose a significant hurdle for
subsequent ANDA filers seeking to enter the market prior to the
expiration of the brand-name patent or invoke a patent misuse
defense. In Pfizer Inc. et ai. v. Apotex Inc. et ai., Apotex, a
subsequent ANDA filer, filed suit against Pfizer, the brand-name
patent holder, seeking to trigger the 180-day marketing exclusivity
period ofRanbaxy, the frrst ANDA filer, regarding Lipitor. 155 As part
of its discovery requests, Apotex sought to obtain the settlement
agreements and documents related to them between Pfizer and
Ranbaxy.156 Pfizer attempted to block the discovery on the grounds
that revealing the agreements and related documents and sought a
protective order covering the documents on the grounds that they
were confidential and would provide Apotex with an "immense
competitive advantage.,,157 In deciding to grant Apotex access to the
settlement agreements, the court recognized the value of such
information to Apotex's suit on several grounds, including its relation
to the considerations directly relevant to the patent at issue such as
obviousness and commercial success. 158 The court also noted that
Apotex might also be able to cultivate a defense of patent misuse
against Pfizer if the evidence suggested that Pfizer induced Ranbaxy
153. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, § 1112(a)(2) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 & 42 U.S.c.) (providing that agreements relating to "(A) the manufacture,
marketing or sale of the brand name drug that is the listed drug in the ANDA
involved; (B) the manufacture, marketing, or sale of the generic drug for which the
ANDA was submitted; or (C) the 180-day [exclusivity] period" must be disclosed).
154. Id. § 1114, 117 Stat. at 2463. The information is also used by the FTC to create
reports aggregating general data on the prevalence of these agreements. See FTC,
supra note 46, at 1.
155. Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 744 F. Supp. 2d 758 (N.D. TIl. 2010).
156. Id. at 761.
157. Id. at 767.
158. Id. at 762.
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to settle by threatening an infringement claim based on the reissuing
of the patent at issue. 159
The secrecy of the reverse payment agreements has also recently
been challenged by Cephalon who is seeking information from the
FTC with regard to the specific agreements on which its reports are
based due to the FTC's reliance on figures from these reports during
the course of litigation. l60 The move has met with significant
resistance by Pfizer and 35 other pharmaceutical companies, who
assert that "[ d]isclosure of these settlement agreements and related
documents in this matter would seriously damage the third parties'
business and legal interests.,,161

B.

A Simpler Alternative: Opening the 180-day Exclusivity Period
to Subsequent Filers

By its nature, law develops incrementally over time and is not as
prone to changes as drastic as those that Congress implements.
Intellectual property law is no different. 162 An incremental approach
to change is particularly beneficial in altering a very complex system,
such as that employed in pharmaceutical patenting, where the
outcome of changes cannot be predicted with confidence. 163
Given the complexity of reverse payment settlements, the great
variation in their terms, and the difficulty in efficiently and
inexpensively determining whether they are pro- or anti-competitive
in nature, an incremental change to the Hatch-Waxman Act may be a
more appropriate solution than a piece of legislation as complicated
as the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act. Indeed, making
an adjustment to the system currently in place presents a simple
solution with the potential to diffuse the problem of reverse payment
settlements over time.
1.

The Patent System Provides an Incentive for Innovation

At the core of the U.S. patent system is the idea that innovation
can be encouraged by granting inventors the exclusive right to

159. Id. (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 731 F.Supp.2d 754, 760 (N.D. TIl. 2010)).
160. Peter Loftus, Pfizer, 36 Other Drug Companies Want Patent Documents Kept Secret,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/artic1e/BT-CO-20110120-712765
.html.
161. Id.
162. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1543,1544-46 (2010).
163. Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 9 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'y 587, 632 (2006).

2012J

Modest Proposals for a Complex Problem

609

manufacture, sell, and license their inventions for a period of time. 164
165
Ultimately, a patent grants its owner the power to exclude others.
Therefore, by granting the patent holder an effective monopoly, the
courts have recognized that the patent system by its nature is at odds
with an antitrust analysis. 166
2.

Absence of the 180-day Exclusivity Period to Subsequent
ANDA Filers Reduces Incentive to Enter the Market Prior to the
Expiration ofthe Brand-name Manufacturer's Patent

The problem presented by reverse payment settlements has its
origins in the incentive to generic manufacturers to gain the l80-day
exclusivity period. 167 Previous changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act
circumvented part of the problem by preventing an initial ANDA filer
from retaining hold of the 180-day exclusivity period indefmitely;
however, loopholes still exist in the law. 168 Further amending the law
to extend the grant of a 180-day exclusivity period to subsequent
filers after a first filer forfeited the period under one of the provisions
of 21 USC § 355 U)(5)(D)(iii) represents a potentially small change
that could bear significant results. Additionally, the need for further
court involvement or consideration of the pro- or anti-competitive
effects of an agreement would be obviated by granting subsequent
ANDA filers the ability to obtain the 180-day exclusivity period.
Two solutions of this variety, one proposed by Henry N. Butler and
Jeffrey Paul Jarosch and another under consideration by Congress,
merit closer scrutiny. 169

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (May 2, 1807), in 5 THE WRlTINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 74, 76 (H.A. Washington ed. 1853) (noting that "ingenuity should
receive a liberal encouragement").
165. Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,215 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066-67 (2003).
167. See supra Part III.
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 63, at 123-24.
164.
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3.

Two Alternative Solutions Related to the I80-day Exclusivity
Period

a.

Any ANDAfiler entering a reverse payment settlement
relinquishes l80-day exclusivity and benefit passes to
subsequent filer

Perhaps the simplest solution to the problem of reverse payment
settlements would be to amend the law so that any ANDA filer who
accepts a reverse payment settlement would forfeit its right to the
I80-day exclusivity period and to allow a subsequent ANDA filer to
be eligible for the exclusivity right. 170 One fundamental problem
with the current system is the lack of incentive to subsequent ANDA
filers to pursue the patenting of a generic version of a drug because
there is less reward to do so once the 180-day exclusivity period is
not available. l7l Subsequent ANDA filers are not guaranteed the
duopoly granted to the fIrst ANDA filer, but they still face the specter
of potentially costly litigation if challenged with infringement by the
innovator company who holds the brand-name patent.
The benefits of such an approach are three-fold. First, such an
amendment would be less controversial than the proposed Preserve
Access to Affordable Generics Act, which has been before Congress
for four sessions without success due to vehement opposition by
conservative congressional members. 172
Second, by allowing
subsequent filers to be eligible for the I80-day exclusivity period,
such a change would not discourage valid settlements, yet it would
still reduce the benefit to a brand-name manufacturer to enter into a
sham agreement. 173 When faced with the possibility of having to
settle with multiple generic manufacturer litigants all vying for the
I80-day exclusivity period, brand-name manufacturers would be less
likely to settle those cases likely to be decided in their favor as a
means of obstructing the entry of generic competitors into the
marketplace. 174 Finally, by making an incremental change, Congress
could avoid adding to the problems already facing the country with
respect to health care costs by not enacting legislation that
overcorrects and overcompensates for the weaknesses currently
present in the system. 175
170.
17l.
172.
173.
174.
175.

!d. at 124.
See supra Part HA2.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.C.
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Drug Price Competition Act: Broadening eligibility for the 180day exclusivity period

The Drug Price Competition Act is a variation on this approach. 176
Rather than the ''wait in line" style approach considered above, the
Act would permit multiple generic manufacturers to jointly share the
I80-day exclusivity period, thus widening the group of applicants
eligible for the incentive. 177 Under this proposal, in order for
subsequent filers to qualify for the exclusivity period after the initial
filer, they would need to meet two conditions. First, the subsequent
filer would have to file its ANDA prior to the first ANDA filer
commencing marketing of the drug. 17S Second, the subsequent filer
would need to either survive an infringement challenge by the brandname manufacturer brought within forty-five days of filing or not be
subject to such a challenge at all. 179
Under this approach, ANDA filers would continue to have
significant incentive to enter the market ahead of a brand-name
manufacturer's patent, thus having the potential to lower prices to
consumers. ISO Brand-name manufacturers would also still have the
possibility of settling litigation, but the lure of entering a reverse
payment settlement to slow the entry of generic competitors would be
reduced given the costs of making payments to mUltiple ANDA filers
in exchange for their agreement to stay off the market. lSI
VI. CONCLUSION
Reverse payment settlements present a unique problem given their
potential to both help and harm consumers faced with high
prescription drug prices. ls2 Given the varied nature of these
settlements and the lack of information publicly available about them,
176. Drug Price Competition Act of 2009, S. 1315, lllth Congo (2009); Drug Price
Competition Act of 2009, H.R. 3777, Illth Congo (dailyed. June 22, 2009). At the
time of this writing, the bill has been not reintroduced during the I 12th Congress. Bill
Summary & Status, 1llth Congress (2009 2010) S.J315
All information,
THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z
?dlll :SNOI315:@@@L&sumrn2=m& (last visited May 30,2012). Interestingly, the
Act did not garner much support during the III th Congress and between the House
and Senate it collected only 3 supporters. 155 Congo Rec. S6887 (2009); 156 Congo
Rec. H472 (2010).
177. S.1315.
178. 1d.
179. 1d.
180. See supra Part III.
181. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part IlI.A.
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as well as, the cost and time needed for the courts to determine
whether agreements are anticompetitive or procompetitive under
antitrust law, alternative solutions to the problem must be
considered. 183 For these reasons, patent misuse represents one
possible defense available to subsequent ANDA filers under the
current system. l84 A better, and simpler, solution would be a small
alteration to the Hatch-Waxman Act broadening the availability 180day exclusivity period so as to provide additional incentive to
subsequent ANDA filers to enter the market and to reduce the
incentive to brand-name manufacturers to enter into reverse payment
settlements in the first place. 185
Alyssa L. Brownf

183. See supra Parts IV.B, VA
184. See supra Part V.A
185. See supra Part V.B.
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ERRATA

The University of Baltimore Law Review regrets the following error
occurring in Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in
LaY1)lering with Multidisciplinary Knowledge About Brain Function
and Human Behavior: What Should Law Students Learn About
Human Behaviorfor Effective Lawyering?, 40 U. BALT. L. REv. 607
(201l).
We offer this correction and apologize for any
inconvenience.
In footnote 128, the second sentence should read:
Professor Margaret A. Berger, renowned evidence law professor and
legal scholar, conducted studies among her law students at Brooklyn
Law School to demonstrate for them that their inaccurate recall of
external facts was substantial and that their conviction of belief
reinforced those inaccuracies.
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